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Abstract: Fault diagnosis for a closed-loop controlled aeronautical system is considered.
The geometry of the problem, the nonlinear model of the aircraft and two guidance laws are
described. A new approach to perform fault detection, based on the study of the control signals,
is then introduced. The method proposed allows the detection and isolation of actuator faults.
Simulation results with measurement uncertainty illustrate the relevance of the approach. The
influence of the guidance law and perspectives are discussed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In-flight securement of aircrafts can be performed either
by completing on-board equipment with additional mea-
surement devices or by means of algorithmic procedures
exploiting the available measurements. In this paper, we
aim at identifying early unexpected changes (faults) in an
aerial system before they lead to a complete breakdown
(failure), without adding sensors. This objective should be
fulfilled by applying Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI)
methods to a class of aerial systems with typical sensors
and actuators. The set of devices is fixed and no hardware
redundancy is allowed. A nonlinear knowledge-based dy-
namical model of the vehicle in state-space form is also
available, but will only be used to design the control law.
FDI for aerial and space vehicles have already been ad-
dressed in many papers (see, e.g., Patton (1991)). Most
of the work of the diagnosis community has been focused
on linear systems but recently there has been some trend
toward fault detection methods for nonlinear systems (see,
e.g., Witczak (2007)). In Marzat et al. (2009), a survey of
the main FDI methods is presented, where both model-
free and model-based methods are described and the most
promising approaches for the aircraft securement problem
in question are shortlisted.
However, all these approaches are passive as they solely
check the consistency between the inputs and outputs
of the monitored system. The control is ignored in this
framework although it may lessen the impact of the failing
components, by modifying the fault dynamics. Control
information provides additional insight on the system be-
havior and should be exploited. This is mainly performed
either by applying active methods or by studying the
closed-loop behavior.
Active fault diagnosis injects an auxiliary input into the
system. The goal of this additional test signal is to distin-
guish faulty behavior from the normal one (Campbell and
Nikoukhah (2004)). Designing this input can be seen as
a multi-objective optimization problem. The signal should
be large enough to permit detection, but also small enough
to avoid performance degradation. This study has been
carried out for linear models only (Niemann (2006)). The
use of feedback information to design the auxiliary input
has been investigated recently (Ashari et al. (2009)). The
major drawback of this approach is that the parameters
of the two models (nominal and faulty) are supposed to
be known, which is scarcely the case in real-world ap-
plications. Concerning aerospace systems, an interesting
attempt is reported in Bateman et al. (2007), where an
active diagnosis procedure for an UAV (unmanned aerial
vehicle) with redundant flight control surfaces is proposed.
Each actuator is excited with a specific signal such that the
global resultant forces and moments are negligible if there
is no fault.
To avoid the complex design of an additional input, an
interesting alternative is to study the behavior of the
system and its faults within the closed loop. The effect
of feedback on robustness of fault diagnosis methods
has been analyzed by Niemann and Stoustrup (1997)
and more recently by Ba¨ıkeche et al. (2006). For linear
transfer function models, it has been shown that model
uncertainty or multiplicative faults make the generated
residuals depend on the control signal. A trade-off must be
achieved between fault detection and performance of the
closed-loop system. This is closely related to dual control,
where a control law is designed in order to enhance a
particular property of the system such as observability
or diagnosability while preserving performance (see, e.g.,
Wittenmark (1995)).
In this paper an alternative approach is described follow-
ing the remark in Ba¨ıkeche et al. (2006): in a feedback-
controlled system, the control input is the signal contain-
ing the most information concerning faults. The originality
of the present work is to study the fault detection problem
from the point of view of a successful mission. If control
fails, then faults may affect the regulated system. This
paper shows how it is possible to detect and isolate them
by analyzing the adequacy of the system response. Con-
trary to the active or control-loop based methods, we do
not use any auxiliary input or trade-off controller that
can affect performance. The control law is designed to
fulfill the mission requirements and the monitoring is based
on residuals showing adequacy to control objectives. The
approach can be said to be model-free, as these signals are
only functions of the measurements and do not rely on the
explicit model of the system.
Section 2 describes the aeronautical case study. The model
of the system, including its sensors and actuators is pre-
sented. Guidance and control laws are described along with
the geometry of the problem. The set of possible faults
affecting the system is also specified. Section 3 explains the
principles of the new approach and presents the expression
of residuals for guidance and control laws previously given.
Section 4 describes the flight scenario, and the results of
the approach for the considered aircraft. Finally, conclu-
sions and perspectives are detailed.
2. MODEL
The case study considered here is based on the aero-
nautical benchmark described in Marzat et al. (2009). It
involves a six-degree-of-freedom surface-to-air missile but
only longitudinal movement is considered here. The au-
tonomous vehicle aims at intercepting a non-maneuvering
target whose position and speed are measured. It could
also be seen as the following of waypoints by an UAV.
In this planar case, two means of control are used. One is
a rudder whose axis is perpendicular to the plane where
the vehicle flies and the other is propulsion rate. The main
sensor is an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) comprising
gyrometers and accelerometers, which is part of an Inertial
Navigation System (INS). These standard components are
preset and there is no hardware redundancy.
2.1 State-space model
• b is the inertia term,
• [x, z] is the position in the inertial frame,
• [vbx, vbz] is the speed in body coordinates,
• θ is the orientation in the (x, z) plane,
• q is the angular velocity,
• δm is the rudder deflection angle,
• η is the propulsion rate,
• Q = 12ρ(v
2
bx + v
2
bz) is the dynamic pressure,
• α = arctan( vbz
vbx
) is the angle of attack,
• m is the aircraft mass,
• fmin and fmax are constants of the propulsion model,
• sref and lref are characteristic dimensions,
• c(.) are the aerodynamic coefficients.
With this notation, the dynamics is described by the
following state equations.


x˙ = cos(θ)vbx + sin(θ)vbz
z˙ = cos(θ)vbz − sin(θ)vbx
˙vbx = −qvbz − sin(θ)g −
Qsref
m
[cx0 + cxAα+ cxδmδm]
+
1
m
[fmin + (fmax − fmin)η]
˙vbz = qvbx + cos(θ)g −
Qsref
m
[cz0 + czAα+ czδmδm]
q˙ =
Qsref lref
b
[
cm0 + cmaα+ cmδmδm +
lref√
v2
bx
+ v2
bz
cmqq
]
θ˙ = q
where the aerodynamic coefficients c(.) are piecewise
continuous nonlinear functions of the Mach value and
angle of attack. The state vector is x = [x, z, vbx, vbz, q, θ]
T,
the input vector is u = [δm, η]
T. This model belongs to the
general class of nonlinear control-affine systems. Note that
the design of the FDI methodology will not involve these
equations, which are only used to tune the control law and
simulate the process.
2.2 Measurements
The IMU provides measurements of non-gravitational ac-
celeration and angular rate. The INS integrates these
signals to estimate position, speed and orientation. The
output vector is thus y = [x, z, x˙, z˙, vbx, vbz, θ, q, abx, abz]
T.
Speed and position of the target are measured either with
a ground radar or with an embedded tracking sensor. The
target information vector is c = [xc, zc, x˙c, z˙c]
T.
2.3 Guidance and control
Interception involves finding a control law such that the
distance between the missile and target goes to zero. The
classical approach defines, in a decoupled way, a guidance
law and then an autopilot that implements the acceleration
orders. The interception criterion can be expressed in
various geometrical ways, which leads to several guidance
laws. In order to describe them, we need the following
definitions:
• The vector between the missile and the target is the
line of sight (LOS): r = [xc − x, zc − z]
T.
• The opposite of the LOS derivative is the closing
velocity : −r˙ = [x˙− x˙c, z˙ − z˙c]
T.
• λ is the LOS angle, and the LOS rate is λ˙ = r×r˙
r2
.
• The missile velocity in the inertial frame is denoted
as vM = [x˙, z˙]
T .
Fig. 1. Geometry of the problem
Guidance laws We consider two classical guidance laws,
namely pure pursuit (PP) and proportional navigation
guidance (PNG). The geometrical rules of both laws are
given next (see Shneydor (1998) for more details).
• Pure pursuit: PP makes the velocity of the pursuer
vM coincide with the LOS r. This is the first guidance
law that has been developed, inspired by how preda-
tors catch their prey. The simplest guidance consign
is then to have the acceleration input proportional to
the angle between the aircraft velocity and the LOS.
This is known as velocity pursuit. Another version
aims at aligning the axis of the vehicle on the LOS:
this is attitude pursuit. In this study, velocity pursuit
will be used.
• Proportional navigation guidance: PNG achieves par-
allel navigation. The geometrical rule is to keep the
direction of the LOS constant relative to inertial
space, i.e., the LOS is kept parallel to the initial LOS.
This is also called constant bearing and the rule could
be very concisely stated as the LOS rate being equal
to zero. The guidance consign is taken proportional
to the LOS rate.
There exist many variations of these two guidance laws
(Lin (1991)). PP is less sensitive to noise than PNG, but
PNG is more effective than PP because of its geometrical
rule (PNG is almost following the optimal straight path).
PNG is the most used law in the majority of guidance
problems.
Fig. 2. Interception with PP (left) and PNG (right)
Control An autopilot has been designed in order to
achieve the guidance acceleration. Propulsion rate is ob-
tained by a proportional regulation of the velocity to a
reference. A linear controller computes the appropriate
rudder angle.
2.4 Failures
We consider two types of actuator faults: the loss of half
of the thrust due to an engine problem, and the locking of
the rudder. Sensor faults are not considered here and will
be addressed elsewhere.
3. APPROACH
3.1 Principles
The starting point is to acknowledge that control signals
hold relevant information concerning faults in closed-loop
systems. The controller is effectively trying to compensate
for faults so as to reach its initial goal. For our inter-
ception problem, the success of the mission is a safety-
critical operation. The fault diagnosis module should give
enough information to decide whether to abort the task.
Therefore, the diagnosis problem can be seen as that of
assessing the adequacy of the system to fulfill the control
requirements. It is equivalent to assuming that there is no
fault if the controlled system is successful. How to detect
faults in this context is now explained.
The fault detection method checks whether the specific
geometrical rules of the guidance law are satisfied. Guid-
ance residuals, for the two laws described in Section 2.3,
are given in Section 3.2. Another signal that shows the
behavior of the propulsion rate and will be used to build
a residual is proposed in Section 3.3. These signals have
predictable behavior when the guidance objective is ful-
filled (equivalent to the absence of faults with our point of
view). Mathematical expressions for all the residuals are
in Table 1.
3.2 Guidance residuals
Pure pursuit Two residuals can be computed for this
guidance law.
• The vehicle velocity should be aligned with the LOS.
The first residual rpp1 is the angle between the speed
of the aircraft and the LOS.
• In both attitude and velocity pursuit, the missile is
required to turn at a rate equal to the LOS rate.
Therefore, the angular velocity should be equal to the
LOS rate for low maneuvering targets. This gives our
second residual, rpp2.
Proportional navigation The only computable residual
rpng for this law is equal to the LOS rate, which should be
equal to zero.
3.3 Propulsion signal analysis
The residuals described in the previous paragraph, mon-
itor the behavior of the rudder. We also need checking
the effectiveness of propulsion. A fault on the propulsion
system is usually sudden. The relevant signal to analyze
this process, rprop, is the quotient of the remaining dis-
tance (the LOS module) to the current speed of the vehicle.
When such a fault occurs, there will be an abrupt change
in the convergence rate of this signal.
Table 1. Expression of the residuals
rpp1 =
180
pi
arcsin
(
vM
‖vM‖
×
r
‖r‖
)
rpp2 =
∥∥q − λ˙∥∥
rpng =
∥∥∥r× r˙
r2
∥∥∥
rprop =
‖r‖
‖vM‖
3.4 Residual analysis
This section presents the residual analysis procedure used
to decide if faults have occurred.
Guidance residual If the control objective is achieved,
we expect the guidance residuals to be small. They cannot
be exactly equal to zero because of the configuration
of the problem: the target is moving and the actuator
response is not instantaneous. Nevertheless, we have a
good idea of the expected response of the system when the
guidance law is designed. Based on that prior knowledge
and the uncertainty level of the sensors (given by the
manufacturer), a simple threshold decision logic can be
chosen. Note that, once the convergence of the residuals
is achieved, the signals do not vary much. It seems then
interesting to monitor the derivatives of the residuals (if
the noise level allows it) or to use a statistical test to detect
a drift in the mean. This is not the principal scope of this
paper but the decision issue should be further addressed
to enhance robustness.
Propulsion residual rprop is another kind of signal. In
normal conditions, this “time-to-go” is regularly decreas-
ing following a globally linear slope. When a propulsion
loss appears, the slope changes. Basically, the aircraft is
slowed down by this fault and thus the interception may
still be possible but later than expected. To identify this
slope change, we propose the following adaptive slope
tracker algorithm which estimates (with a least-square
method) the parameters of the slope on an interval, and
uses them to predict the expected values of rprop on the
next interval. The mean squared error between the predic-
tion and the real value is computed on this next interval.
We thus obtain one error value for each interval, except the
first one. This error signal is expected to be small in normal
operating conditions and large for the interval where the
slope change occurs.
Algorithm 1. Online slope change detection
n← number of points in each interval
k ← 1
eprop ← 0
[a1, a2]← [0, 0]
loop
• On interval [k, k + n],
estimate [a1, a2] such as rprop = a1t+ a2
• On interval [k + n, k + 2n],
eprop(k) =
1
n
∑k+2n
j=k+n [rprop(j)− (a1j + a2)]
2
• k ← k + n
end loop
4. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section shows the results of the method presented
in Section 3 on the model detailed in Section 2. The
simulation time step is 0.01s.
4.1 Flight scenario and fault occurrences
Flight conditions are given in Table 2 and faults considered
in Table 3. Successful interception trajectories have been
shown in Figure 2. Missed interception for both laws due
to rudder locking is displayed in Figure 3. Note that the
propulsion fault may just delay the interception, but could
also make it fail if the missile becomes slower than its
target. The rudder mainly controls the vehicle orientation,
while the thrust influences the norm of the velocity. The
guidance residuals contain only angle or angular velocity
information and thus will strongly react to rudder locking.
The propulsion residual is function of the velocity norm
and will be affected by propulsion loss only.
Table 2. Flight conditions
Nominal speed Initial position
Target 150 m/s
x = 5000m
z = 3000m
Missile 270 m/s
x = 0m
z = 0m
Table 3. Faults considered
Component affected Propulsion Rudder
Fault 50% loss lock-in-place
Interpretation engine failure power failure, freezing
Instant 18 s 20 s
Fig. 3. Missed interception with PP (left) and PNG
(right)
We now describe the uncertainty affecting the IMU and
the target tracking device. IMU measurements are subject
to various errors such as biases, scale factors and noise.
Considering, for example, a one-axis sensor q˜ measuring
the roll rate q, the measure is modeled as: q˜ = kqq +
bq + N(0, σ
2
q ) where kq is the scale factor, bq the bias
and σq the standard deviation of a zero-mean Gaussian
white noise. These three parameters (for each sensor)
are characteristic of the IMU and should fall within a
set of values provided by the manufacturer. The target
tracking device is supposed to be only affected by zero-
mean Gaussian white noise.
4.2 Results
The first case we consider is the locking of the rudder alone.
Pure pursuit guidance Remember that we have two
residuals for the PP guidance law. The first one, rpp1, is not
much affected by measurement uncertainty because it only
uses the measured position of the target and the velocity
measurements provided by the aircraft IMU/INS. The sec-
ond residual, rpp2, is much noisier because its computation
requires both position and velocity of the target. The two
signals, filtered with a fourth-order Butterworth low-pass
filter to reduce the noise effect, are shown in Figure 4. Both
residuals are reacting to the fault in the same time scale.
Proportional navigation guidance The rpng signal is very
noisy, due to the use of the measurements of target position
and speed, along with IMU outputs. Therefore, if we use a
simple threshold logic we have to choose a relatively high
value to avoid a high false-alarm rate. Figure 5 displays
the rpng signal in normal and faulty circumstances. It has
been filtered the same way as the other residuals. It would
probably be preferable to use a statistical test to detect an
abrupt change in the mean of this residual. This remark
also stands for the processing of rpp2.
Fig. 4. Pursuit residuals: no fault (up) and rudder locked
(down)
Fig. 5. PNG residual: no fault (left) and rudder locked
(right)
Thrust residual Consider now the 50% loss of propulsion.
The residual rprop that should monitor the propulsion
behavior depends little on the guidance law. This is why
only the results with PNG are shown on Figure 6, as the
results with PP should be similar. On this figure is also
displayed the error signal eprop obtained with Algorithm 1,
which is actually our residual. The detection is achieved
with a delay equal to the width of the interval window.
Here a window of 100 points has been chosen, leading to
a one-second delay.
Chosen thresholds and corresponding detection delays
for all the residuals are shown in Table 4. Two choices
are given for each threshold: an optimistic one and a
conservative one. Note that the detection delay for the
rudder fault may appear high, but it is justified by the
incipient behavior of the fault.
Finally, we consider the two faults successively: first the
rudder locking at 18s then the thrust loss at 20s. Figure 7
shows that each residual (eprop to the propulsion and
Fig. 6. Propulsion residual: no fault (left) and half propul-
sion (right)
Table 4. Residual analysis and detection delays
Residual Threshold values Detection delay
rpp1
1.75°
2°
3.6 s
5.3 s
rpp2
0.002 s−1
0.003 s−1
2.3 s
4.86 s
rpng
0.003 s−1
0.004 s−1
2.5 s
5.19 s
eprop > 0.0005 1 s
Fig. 7. Two successive faults: propulsion (left) and rudder
(right) residuals
rpng to the rudder) is sensitive to only one fault. This
demonstrates the possibility of fault isolation.
The PP law allows a more reliable decision than with
only the PNG residual, because its two available resid-
uals contain little noise. However, proportional navigation
guidance has been found to be more efficient in most appli-
cations: miss distance and interception time are lower than
those obtained with PP. Selection of either law becomes a
trade-off between efficiency and safety.
4.3 Elements of comparison
The newly proposed method has to be compared with
other approaches to evaluate its potential as objectively
as possible. A first comparison strategy is to extract
results from papers on closely related topics. However,
models and simulation conditions differ so the exercise
is limited in scope to some rather general statement.
For example, the active method described in Bateman
et al. (2007) is applied to an UAV in order to detect
rudder locking. The results reported in this paper show
detection delays comparable to our values. This active
method, however, requires hardware redundancy and may
destabilize the system with the additional inputs involved.
On the contrary, the missile involved in our case study
is equipped with non-redundant devices and leaves the
control law unchanged.
A complementary comparison strategy, which is being
carried out but requires much more time, is to implement
all the approaches to be compared on the same signifi-
cant test case. The system used in the present paper is
part of a generic test-case for in-flight FDI, which has
classical dynamics, sensors, actuators and faults scenarios
(cf Marzat et al. (2009)). The results of the candidate
approaches should be evaluated with respect to detection
delays, but also to false-alarm and non-detection rates,
and computational complexity. The development of a sys-
tematic comparison method between diagnosis approaches
is seeked for. Such a method should tune each diagnosis
procedure to its best before comparing them on the basis of
performance indices such as those mentioned above. The
design of this methodology is beyond the scope of this
paper but at the heart of our future work.
Nevertheless, the way our method is built already gives us
some information on its usefulness. Model-based methods
will require more knowledge of the system, more param-
eters to be tuned and more computational complexity
than the one proposed here, which should be particularly
interesting when no model is available, or when the model
turns out to be too complex to be employed.
5. CONCLUSIONS
A model-free fault diagnosis method based on the study of
closed-loop control signals has been proposed. This strat-
egy has been applied to a realistic aeronautical benchmark
composed of an aircraft with typical non-redundant sen-
sors and actuators, described by its nonlinear longitudinal
model. These first results are encouraging, but further
investigations are needed to enhance the decision process
(with, e.g., statistical considerations). The tuning of the
thresholds should not only consider detection delay but
also other performance indices such as false-alarm and
non-detection rates. The effect of possible disturbances
(wind) may be taken into account. Note that these ro-
bustness issues stand true for every diagnosis method and
no simple solution is available. To clarify the situation,
the design of a systematic comparison method between
diagnosis approaches is to be addressed in the immediate
future.
More generally, the new approach we have described
has attractive properties compared to those described
in Section 1. Active fault diagnosis may cause stability
or controllability problems, due to unknown dynamics
induced by additional inputs. Our method exploits the
guidance constraints that form the basis of the elaboration
of the control law. Therefore no performance reduction is
observed, contrary to methods that try to combine control
and diagnosis. If the control law is correctly designed
according to the mission and physical constraints, fault
diagnosis can be performed easily within the described
framework. The model-free nature of the approach allows
its application to every kind of model and not linear ones
only.
Extension to the three-dimensional case should be straight-
forward. We will then have three different residuals that
should allow detection of faults on each rudder (and par-
tial isolation, due to coupling), along with the propulsion
residual to identify thrust trouble.
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